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WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE:




In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987),
and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Supreme Court held
that an agency could not, consistent with the Takings Clause, condition
a permit on a land exaction unless the exaction bears an “essential nexus”
and “rough proportionality” to the harms the government seeks to miti-
gate. Then, in Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District, 133 S. Ct.
2586 (2013), the Court extended Nollan and Dolan to exactions that were
never completed because the property owner refused to acquiesce to the
demand. Nevertheless, the Court held that such property owners suffer
a “constitutionally cognizable injury” under the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine because the government has significantly burdened their
right not to have property taken without just compensation. Because the
case arose under a Florida statute, the Court did not decide what the
proper federal remedy would be in these “failed exaction” cases.
This Article argues that failed exaction plaintiffs should be enti-
tled to actual damages under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Because failed exactions do not involve a completed taking, the
Just Compensation Clause is not the proper remedy. However, a recog-
nized constitutional injury cannot go uncompensated. Limiting the remedy
to invalidation of the offending condition suffers from two faults. First,
it fails to provide property owners with adequate compensation. Second,
it does not serve as a deterrent to agencies. An invalidation remedy stand-
ing alone gives permitting agencies a “do-over” and encourages them to
use the permitting process to prevent development through the use of
1 See COOL HAND LUKE (Jalem Productions 1967).
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unconstitutional conditions. On the contrary, a damages remedy is sup-
ported by Section 1983 and serves the twin aims of deterrence and compen-
sation. Courts should hold that property owners bringing a failed exaction
claim under Koontz are entitled to their actual economic damages.
Along with that federal damages remedy, this Article argues that
these plaintiffs should be able to bring their claims directly in federal court.
Because failed exaction plaintiffs have not suffered a taking, they cannot
seek just compensation. Therefore, the ripeness rule for federal takings
claims established in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 185 (1985), which generally re-
quires property owners to seek just compensation in state court to “ripen”
a takings claim, does not apply to failed exactions. Property owners suing
under a Koontz theory should be able to assert their federal constitutional
rights directly in federal court.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
I. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . 166
A. Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B. Application to Land-Use Exactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
II. THE KOONTZ REMEDY QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE SHOULD
PROVIDE A FEDERAL DAMAGES REMEDY FOR FAILED
EXACTION PLAINTIFFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
A. A Mandatory Injunction Cannot Be the Proper
Remedy in Most Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B. Mere Invalidation Is Not Enough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
C. Damages Remedies Are Common in Other
Unconstitutional Conditions Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
D. Failed Exactions Are Analogous to Arbitrary and
Capricious Permit Denials, Where Courts Have
Consistently Awarded Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
E. Calculating Damages in Failed Exaction Cases . . . . 190
F. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
IV. KOONTZ AND WILLIAMSON COUNTY RIPENESS—THE DOOR TO
FEDERAL COURT IS AJAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A. Brief Overview of the Williamson County State
Litigation Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
B. The Rationale of Williamson County Is Inapplicable to
Failed Exactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
2015] WHAT WE HAVE IS A FAILURE TO COMPENSATE 165
INTRODUCTION
When a government entity conditions the receipt of a benefit on
a person’s agreement to give up a constitutional right, it violates the
Constitution in the same way as if it had denied the right in the first
instance.2 This maxim, dubbed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
“vindicates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the govern-
ment from coercing people into giving them up.”3 One such right that has
been robustly protected by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the
right not to have private property “taken for public use without just
compensation.”4 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission5 and Dolan v. City of Tigard6 established that a per-
mitting agency may not demand unreasonable land exactions from property
owners in exchange for approval of a development permit.7 Then, in
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court clarified
that imposition of an unconstitutional condition violates the Constitution,
even where the permitting agency demands money in return for a permit
and the permit is ultimately denied.
While Koontz demonstrated that permitting agencies cannot easily
evade the protections established by Nollan and Dolan, it left open the
scope of the remedy available to plaintiffs who can establish that their
permit application was denied because they refused to accede to an un-
constitutional exaction.8 This Article argues that property owners should
be entitled to invalidation of the offending condition as well as actual
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Damages are necessary to compensate
property owners for the injury suffered when they do not give in to an
unconstitutional demand. They also serve to deter government agencies
from imposing unconstitutional conditions by providing an incentive to
negotiate fairly. Limiting the remedy to invalidation would not accom-
plish either of these objectives.
Furthermore, this Article will explain the need for a federal forum
to adjudicate these Section 1983 claims and illustrate how Koontz further
undermines the much-beleaguered ripeness doctrine of Williamson County
2 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013) (collecting cases).
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
7 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374.
8 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597.
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Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City.9 Plain-
tiffs suing under Koontz may have suffered a constitutional injury from
a so-called “failed exaction,”10 but they cannot allege that their property
was actually taken, and therefore cannot seek a remedy under the Just
Compensation Clause. If a federal remedy is available in such cases, it
derives solely from Section 1983, and Williamson County’s reasoning and
requirements are therefore inapplicable to these claims.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide a gen-
eral background of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and explain
how it applies to exactions and threatened exactions. Part II will intro-
duce the question left open by the Court in Koontz—what federal remedy
applies when a permit application is denied because of refusal to accept
an unconstitutional condition? Part III will argue that mere invalidation
of the condition is an insufficient remedy and that Section 1983 entitles
these plaintiffs to receive damages. Part IV will argue that Section 1983
“failed exaction” claims should be exempt from the ripeness requirements
of Williamson County. A short conclusion will sum up the arguments.
I. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
A. Formation
It was not always the case that the government lacked power to
impose conditions on the exercise of constitutional rights. In fact, there
is major tension between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and
the oft-repeated argument that a greater power necessarily includes a
lesser one.11 Justice Bradley is believed to be the first to use the term
9 See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985).
10 See Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 631–34 (2012).
11 The “greater-includes-the-lesser” argument—namely, the idea that if government has
the power to entirely prohibit an activity, it necessarily may place any restriction on that
activity—has strong intuitive appeal. Indeed, one commentator, explaining the tension
between it and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, noted that “each statement—‘no
unconstitutional conditions’ and ‘the greater includes the lesser’—seems so self-evidently
correct that it appears to follow, with mathematical certainty, that one’s conclusion is
correct.” Brooks R. Funderberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separa-
bility Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 376–78 (1995). Even as the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine has become widely accepted, the Supreme Court has not rejected the
general premise that greater powers include lesser ones. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996) (“[W]e do not dispute the proposition that greater
powers include lesser ones.”); see also Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478
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“unconstitutional conditions”12 in his dissent in the 1876 case of Doyle v.
Continental Insurance Company.13 There, the majority upheld a Wisconsin
statute that required the Secretary of State to revoke the business li-
cense of any out-of-state insurance company that exercised its right to
remove a case from a Wisconsin state court to a federal court.14 The Court
reasoned that because the plaintiff had no constitutional right to do busi-
ness in Wisconsin, the State must necessarily have the power to place
conditions on a business license.15 In response, Justice Bradley delivered
a powerful rebuke of the “greater power includes the lesser” rule:
The argument used, that the greater always includes the
less, and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees
without any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is
not sound. It is just as unsound as it would be for me to
say, that, because I may without cause refuse to receive a
man as my tenant, therefore I may make it a condition of
his tenancy that he shall take the life of my enemy, or rob
my neighbor of his property.16
His concerns fell upon mostly deaf ears at first. In 1892, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected an individual’s claim that his
rights were violated when he was fired from a local police force in retalia-
tion for political acts.17 Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of Massachu-
setts, observed that “[t]here are few employments for hire in which the
servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech
as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.”18 Under this
theory, Holmes posited that an employee “may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man.”19 This is the classic statement of the “greater power includes the
lesser” doctrine;20 because the local government does not have to employ
U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (“In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gam-
bling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”).
12 Funderberg, supra note 11, at 388.
13 Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 542 (majority opinion).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 543–44 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
17 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
18 Id. at 517–18.
19 Id. at 517.
20 See Funderberg, supra note 11, at 376–77.
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a particular policeman at all, it may demand that someone give up his
constitutional rights in exchange for the job.
The Court generally adhered to Justice Holmes’ view during the
first half of the twentieth century,21 but it eventually embraced Justice
Bradley’s position. In a series of cases, the Court established that govern-
ments may not condition public employment on a person’s agreement not
to exercise his freedom to speak on matters of public concern.22 Although
most unconstitutional conditions cases arise under the First Amendment,23
the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the doctrine to prevent
the government from compromising rights under the Fourth Amendment24
and the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.25 Thus,
it is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has “long since rejected”
Justice Holmes’ theory.26 In the process, it has, as a practical matter,
rejected the notion that the greater government power always includes
the lesser.
B. Application to Land-Use Exactions
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission granted the Nollans
a permit to build a single-family home on their coastal property subject
to a requirement that they dedicate a public-access easement.27 The Nollans
objected to the condition and a California trial court granted relief, but
the California Court of Appeal reversed.28 That court upheld the ease-
ment exaction on the ground that it was at least somewhat related to the
need for coastal access.29 It completed the constitutional analysis in a mere
21 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983) (citing Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952)); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930); and Ex
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
22 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144–45; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574
(1968).
23 See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 801, 810 (2003).
24 See Lebron v. Sec’y, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that government
cannot condition receipt of benefits on waiver of Fourth Amendment rights); see also
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights cannot be a condition of pretrial release).
25 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679 (1996) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973) (holding that a threat of disqualification from public contracting
for five years as a penalty for asserting the privilege was an unconstitutional condition)).
26 Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
27 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
28 Id. at 829–30.
29 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 723 (1986). The California Court
of Appeal found that the trial court erred in requiring the Commission to demonstrate
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two pages and failed to cite any federal cases, much less the Supreme
Court’s unconstitutional conditions precedent.30 The Nollans successfully
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari after the California
Supreme Court denied review.31
In the Supreme Court, the Coastal Commission argued that its
exaction was constitutional so long as it was a legitimate exercise of the
state’s police power and did not qualify as a taking under the Court’s
then-existing takings tests.32 But the majority required more. First, the
Court concluded that the Commission would have violated the Takings
Clause had it simply demanded the easement outside of the permitting
context.33 However, the majority recognized that a state has the power
to deny a development permit for any number of legitimate reasons.34
Thus, the Court concluded that an exaction is unconstitutional unless it
“serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit.”35 In the Nollans’ case, the easement lacked any “nexus” to the
Commission’s stated purpose of protecting views of the beach.36 There-
fore, the Commission lacked the power to exact property that it would
not be able to take in the abstract without providing compensation.37
Although the Court did not explicitly invoke the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, it did address the Commission’s argument that it
that the development would create “a direct burden on public access.” Id. On the con-
trary, it followed its construction of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Associated
Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971), and required “only
an indirect relationship between an exaction and a need to which the project contributes.”
Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723 (citing Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 3d
148, 165 (1985)).
30 See Nollan, 177 Cal. App. at 723.
31 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
32 See Brief for Appellee at 14–15, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
First, the Commission would have had the Court determine whether the deed restriction
was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Brief for Appellee at 14 (citing Vill.
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). Second, the Commission argued that
so long as the exaction satisfied rational basis review, it was constitutional if it did not
contravene the Court’s established takings jurisprudence, such as the balancing test of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Brief for
Appellee at 15.
33 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
34 Id. at 835–36.
35 Id. at 836.
36 Id. at 838 (“It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already
on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles
to viewing the beach created by the new house.”).
37 Id. at 841–42.
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could demand the exaction as a condition so long as it had the power to
deny the permit altogether.38 The majority conceded that the “greater-
includes-the-lesser” argument has significant force when the condition
on permit approval serves the same interest as would an outright denial.39
When the relationship breaks down, however, so does the constitutional
justification for the condition. As the Court explained, while a state could
constitutionally ban shouting “fire” in a crowded theater, it could not then
grant exemptions to those willing to pay a tax of $100, because the pay-
ment has no relationship to the harm caused by shouting “fire.”40 Thus,
even though the opinion did not explicitly rely upon the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, its rejection of a broad “greater-includes-the-lesser”
rationale reveals Nollan to be the first unconstitutional conditions case
to vindicate property rights.
Seven years later, the Court was called upon to define the precise
scope of Nollan. This time, it left no doubt that it had applied the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions in Nollan and would do so again in
Dolan.41 There, a small-business owner applied to the City for a permit
to raze her original store, build a new one about twice the size, and pave a
larger parking lot.42 The City Planning Commission told her that she
could have the permit on two conditions: that she dedicate a portion of her
property along a 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage
system, and give up an additional 15-foot strip of land for a bicycle path-
way.43 Unsatisfied with the conditions, Mrs. Dolan took her appeal through
the Oregon state courts and all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.44
The Supreme Court agreed with the City that, under Nollan, there
was a nexus between the demanded exactions and the government’s
38 See id. at 836.
39 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
40 Id. at 837.
41 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (“Under the well-settled doctrine
of ‘unconstitutional conditions,’ the government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken
for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government
where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.” (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High
Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
547 (2005) (describing Nollan and Dolan as “special application[s]” of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine).
42 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377, 379.
43 Id. at 380.
44 Id. at 382–83.
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interests in prevention of flooding and reduction of traffic congestion.45
However, the Court found that the City had not undertaken any individ-
ualized assessment to determine whether the exaction was roughly pro-
portional to the impact of the proposed development.46 As a result, the
required dedications could not withstand judicial scrutiny.47 Simply put,
after Nollan and Dolan, government “may not leverage its legitimate in-
terest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential
nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”48
After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., where a unanimous Court described
Nollan and Dolan as a “special application” of the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine,49 commentators agreed that the Court had created a
new strand of unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence for land-use
exactions, but they disagreed on the implications of that development.50
Contrary to the expectations of many, however, transforming Nollan and
Dolan into unconstitutional conditions cases has actually expanded their
scope.51 In Koontz, the Court considered for the first time whether Nollan
45 Id. at 387.
46 Id. at 388 (“The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree
of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions bears the required relationship to
the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development.”); Id. at 391 (“We think a term
such as ‘rough proportionality’ best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”).
47 Id. at 395–96.
48 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013).
49 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
50 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the
Property Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 820 (2006)
(“Even the care that the Lingle Court took to make clear that it was not disturbing either
Nollan or Dolan will likely have just the opposite effect.”); James S. Burling, Do Inclu-
sionary Zoning Laws Violate Nollan, Dolan, and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions,
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 83, 85 (2007) (“However, the Court in Lingle
also made it very clear that Nollan and Dolan retained their full vitality, repeating the
formula of these cases, but noting instead that they fell under the rubric of ‘unconstitu-
tional conditions’ rather than ‘substantially advance’ takings.”); Daniel L. Siegal, Exactions
After Lingle: How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
Limits Their Scope, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577, 588–612 (2009) (arguing that explicit re-
liance on unconstitutional conditions limits Nollan and Dolan to adjudicative exactions
of real property).
51 See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131,
142 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz substantially expanded the scope
of exactions analysis under the Nollan/Dolan framework.”); Israel Piedra, Confusing
Regulatory Takings with Regulatory Exactions: The Supreme Court Gets Lost in the Swamp 
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and Dolan should apply where a property owner is denied a permit be-
cause he refused to accede to a demand that he pay for improvements
elsewhere.52 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, explained that gov-
ernment agencies are still subject to the constraints of Nollan and Dolan
when they deny permits for failure to pay a monetary exaction.53 The Court
reasoned that “[a] contrary rule . . . would enable the government to evade
the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for
property as conditions precedent to permit approval.”54
The majority opinion was yet another example of the unconstitu-
tional conditions rationale prevailing over the “greater-includes-the-lesser”
argument. Justice Alito specifically rejected the water district’s argument
that, because it has the power to outright deny any permit application, it
may require the applicant to pay for unrelated mitigation as a condition
of receiving the permit instead.55 The Court held that “[e]ven if [the dis-
trict] would have been entirely within its rights in denying the permit for
some other reason, that greater authority does not imply a lesser power
to condition permit approval on [the property owner’s] forfeiture of his con-
stitutional rights.”56 Koontz thus represents another expansion in the
protection of individual rights under the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine as well as perhaps the final nail in the coffin for the “greater-includes-
the-lesser” theory.
The majority’s application of Nollan and Dolan in Koontz illustrates
how framing the case as a freestanding unconstitutional conditions
violation broadened the scope of the exactions cases.57 All nine justices
agreed that the water district had taken no property from Mr. Koontz.58
Yet the majority concluded that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
filled the gap left by the lack of an actual taking. Justice Alito explained
of Koontz, 41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 562 (2014) (“The Court’s conclusion in Koontz
unwisely expanded the intended scope of Nollan and Dolan.”).
52 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–94.
53 Id. at 2591, 2595–96, 2598–2600.
54 Id. at 2595.
55 Id. at 2596.
56 Id.
57 See Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and
the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURO L. REV. 403, 407–09 (2014) (arguing that the
Koontz Court concluded “the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its broad anti-
coercion principle could at once resolve and even transcend any formalist concerns about
takings doctrine and the Fifth Amendment’s text”).
58 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (“Where the permit is denied and the condition is never im-
posed, nothing has been taken.”); id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the government
denies a permit because an owner has refused to accede to that same demand, nothing
has actually been taken.”); Fenster, supra note 57, at 408.
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that “[e]xtortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property
but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property
taken without just compensation.”59 As such, if Mr. Koontz could show
that the water district’s demand exceeded the limits set by Nollan and
Dolan, he would establish a “constitutionally cognizable injury.”60 Koontz
both significantly expanded the reach of Nollan and Dolan, and trans-
formed how commentators viewed those cases.61 This Article argues that
the change effected by Koontz opens the door to expanded damages rem-
edies under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II. THE KOONTZ REMEDY QUESTION
While the Koontz decision was widely hailed as a great victory for
property rights,62 it left one important question unresolved. Namely, what
is the proper remedy for a property owner whose permit application is
denied because he refused to accede to the government’s demands? The
Court held only that Nollan and Dolan apply to permit denials and
monetary exactions, but remanded the case to the Florida state courts to
59 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
60 Id.
61 Before Koontz, most commentators had viewed Nollan and Dolan primarily as takings
cases with some unconstitutional conditions undertones. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings
Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 609, 633 n.116 (2004) (“I assume throughout this Article that Nollan and
Dolan are better understood as takings cases analogous to unconstitutional conditions
precedents, rather than as unconstitutional conditions cases with a takings overlay. The
Court’s reasoning and analysis in Nollan and Dolan clearly viewed the challenged
regulations as takings and applied the standard test for contemporary takings analysis,
which asks whether the regulation ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.’ ”
(quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard
Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, IOWA L. REV. 1, 45 (2000–2001)
(arguing that “the standards for determining whether the government has acted wrong-
fully must come from the substantive constitutional doctrines; the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine cannot itself supply these standards”). But see Thomas W. Merrill,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 859,
859–60, 866–67 (1994–1995) (“By far the most extensive discussion in Dolan, however,
concerned the nexus or germaneness requirement sometimes associated with the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.”).
62 See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 888 (2013);
Brian T. Hodges, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District and Its Impli-
cations for Takings Law, 14 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 39 (2013); Ilya
Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas
Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 215, 226–41
(2012–2013).
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determine the proper remedy under that State’s law.63 As Justice Alito
explained, the Court “need not decide whether federal law authorizes
plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims pred-
icated on the Takings Clause because petitioner brought his claim under
state law.”64 Mr. Koontz’s potential problem was that he brought his claim
under a Florida statute authorizing recovery of damages for “an unrea-
sonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without
just compensation.”65 But the Supreme Court could only decide whether
the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in determining that Nollan and
Dolan are inapplicable to permit denials and monetary exactions.66 It had
no power to determine the proper remedy under a state statute.67
Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority on the remedy ques-
tion. In her view, it was wrong to remand the case to the Florida courts
because it was clear on the face of the statute that Mr. Koontz had no
state-law remedy.68 Although she recognized that the existence of a rem-
edy under a state statute was a question “which we usually do well to
leave to state courts,” this time was different.69 The statute so plainly
applied only to actions constituting a taking that it could not possibly
create a remedy for Mr. Koontz in a situation where all nine justices
agreed no taking had occurred.70 Thus, even assuming the majority was
correct about the proper application of Nollan and Dolan, Justice Kagan
and her dissenting colleagues would have affirmed the judgment in favor
of the water district on that ground alone.71
On remand, the Florida District Court of Appeal once again held
that Mr. Koontz was entitled to damages under the statute.72 Echoing
Justice Kagan, Judge Griffin once again dissented. She argued that, be-
cause the Court unanimously agreed there had been no taking, “[i]f there
63 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597–98; see also Somin, supra note 62, at 240–41 (“A key
point left unaddressed in Koontz is the question of what sort of remedy is available to
landowners who successfully challenge conditions linked to permit denials.”).
64 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597.
65 FLA. STAT. § 373.617(3).
66 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603.
67 See id. at 2597–98.
68 Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
70 Id. (“In what legal universe could a law authorizing damages only for a ‘taking’ also
provide damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred?”).
71 Id. (“So I would, once more, affirm the Florida Supreme Court, not make it say again
what it has already said—that Koontz is not entitled to money damages.”).
72 St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, No. 5D06-1116,  2014 WL 1703942, at
*1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2014).
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is to be a summary disposition of this case, in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision . . . , that disposition must be in favor of the
[water district], not Koontz.”73 This was true because of the analytical
difference between “exactions taking” cases like Nollan and Dolan and
“failed exactions” like Koontz.74 In the latter case, “the agency has com-
mitted a legal wrong that may be redressed in a variety of ways, includ-
ing a damages remedy if authorized by state law.”75 That legal wrong is
a freestanding unconstitutional conditions violation, which does not
require an actual taking in order to be a “constitutionally cognizable in-
jury.”76 But, in the view of the dissents (and quite possibly of the Florida
Supreme Court), Mr. Koontz simply sued under the wrong statute for the
wrong remedy.77
Even if we assume that Justice Kagan and Judge Griffin are correct
about the lack of a remedy under state law, that answer raises the ques-
tion of whether property owners in Mr. Koontz’s position may recover
damages under federal law through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As noted above,
Koontz explicitly left open the question of any federal remedy because it
was unnecessary to the outcome.78 Scott Woodward has argued in a recent
article that the Nollan/Dolan/Koontz standard “is really more of a pro-
phylactic standard than a remedial standard” and thus the proper remedy
is simply the invalidation of the offending condition.79 He assumes that
the only possible remedies for an unconstitutional conditions violation in
73 Id. at *2 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at *3.
75 Id.
76 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596 (majority opinion).
77 See id. at 2597 (citing the water district’s argument that Mr. Koontz “sued in the wrong
court, for the wrong remedy, and at the wrong time.”); id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“[N]one of the Florida courts in this case suggested that the majority’s hypothesized
remedy actually exists; rather, the trial and appellate courts imposed a damages remedy
on the mistaken theory that there had been a taking (although of exactly what neither
was clear).”); St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011)
(noting that even if Nollan/Dolan applied, there would still be no claim because “nothing
was ever taken from Mr. Koontz.”) (emphasis added); Koontz V, 2014 WL 1703942, at *8
(Griffin, J., dissenting) (“Because there was no ‘taking’ compensable under the Fifth
Amendment in this case, the question remains whether Koontz has a damages remedy
under [the Florida statute].”).
78 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“where the permit is denied and the condition is never
imposed, nothing has been taken.”); id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[w]hen the govern-
ment denies a permit because an owner has refused to accede to that same demand,
nothing has actually been taken.”).
79 Scott Woodward, The Remedy for a “Nollan/Dolan Unconstitutional Conditions Viola-
tion”, 38 VT. L. REV. 701, 703 (2014).
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the exactions context are “just compensation” under the Fifth Amend-
ment and invalidation.80 However, Woodward neglects to consider the
traditional remedy afforded plaintiffs who suffer federal constitutional vio-
lations: actual damages.81 In the next section of this Article, I argue that
“failed exaction” plaintiffs should be treated the same as other federal civil
rights plaintiffs, and the remedy under federal law should be invalidation
and damages under Section 1983.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE SHOULD
PROVIDE A FEDERAL DAMAGES REMEDY FOR FAILED
EXACTION PLAINTIFFS
When the Supreme Court indicated in Koontz that “the impermis-
sible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable
injury,”82 it implicitly distinguished “failed exaction” cases from the “exac-
tion takings” at issue in Nollan and Dolan.83 While some commentators
and courts believed the difference was simply that Nollan and Dolan were
inapplicable to permit denials,84 the Koontz majority rejected that view.85
Instead, with respect to the application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, the relevant distinction between permit approvals and denials
lies in the available remedies.86 As the Court explained, “[w]hile the
80 See id. at 708–09 (arguing that Nollan and Dolan “are more supportive of an invalida-
tion remedy than a just compensation remedy”).
81 See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–57 (1978) (agreeing with plaintiffs that “the
basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation
for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 84
nn.5–7 (1989) (collecting cases for the proposition that compensation and deterrence are
the main purposes of Section 1983 liability).
82 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
83 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 638–40 (“Failed exactions, in which agencies have issued
no conditional approval, differ from Nollan and Dolan.”).
84 See, e.g., St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011) (“[T]he
Nollan/Dolan rule . . . is applicable only where the condition/exaction sought by the gov-
ernment involves a dedication of or over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange
for permit approval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues the permit
sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest in the real property subject to the dedi-
cation imposed.”); Fenster, supra note 10, at 646 (“Failed exactions claims are non-
cognizable under the Supreme Court’s Nollan and Dolan tests, and the non-existent
conditions that would form the basis of such claims cannot constitute property under the
plain text of the Takings Clause.”).
85 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595–97, 2600.
86 See id. at 2597 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment only mandates a particular
remedy for takings, which would only occur if the permit was first accepted then found
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unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that [the permit denial]
burdens a constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment mandates a particu-
lar remedy—just compensation—only for takings.”87 But if Nollan and
Dolan apply, yet the Fifth Amendment remedy does not, another remedy
must be available. After all, the Court has long held “that every right, when
withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”88
Prior commentators addressing the failed exactions issue, both
before and after Koontz, have made the mistake of considering only the
possibility of a Fifth Amendment just compensation remedy.89 But, aside
from the Just Compensation Clause, there are three possible remedies:
invalidation of the condition (effectively sending the permit application
back to the administrative process); an injunction directing the govern-
ment to issue the permit without the offending condition;90 and damages.91
to constitute an unconstitutionally extortionate demand, but which would not occur if the
permit was originally denied on such grounds).
87 Id.
88 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
89 See Woodward, supra note 79, at 708 (contrasting the remedy of invalidation with
payment of just compensation); Fenster, supra note 10, at 638 (“[I]f the property owner
wins, how does the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly provides only one remedy, ‘just
compensation,’ provide a suitable remedy for a condition that was never exacted and for
a rejected development application that the government was authorized to reject?” (foot-
note omitted)). Others have simply mischaracterized the Koontz decision as holding that
the denial of a permit for refusing to accede to an unconstitutional condition is a taking. See
Catherine Contino, Note, Monetary Exactions: Not Just Compensation? The Expansion
of Nollan and Dolan in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 25 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 465, 466–67 (2014).
90 Neither injunctive remedy would be available if failed exactions were treated as the
equivalent of unconstitutional takings. The Court has repeatedly said that just compen-
sation, and not an injunction, is the proper remedy for a taking. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct.
at 2597; Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990); Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) (“Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an
alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit
for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.”
(footnote omitted)).
91 Damages under Section 1983 are distinct from the just compensation remedy under the
Fifth Amendment. The statute provides a cause of action in law or equity against any
person, including local governments, for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013). Just
compensation is a remedy specifically available under the Fifth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Section 1983 even allows for the recovery of punitive damages, a
remedy unrecognizable to the Just Compensation Clause. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 35–36 (1983).
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As will be demonstrated in the remainder of this section, the proper
remedies for a Koontz-type unconstitutional conditions violation are both
invalidation of the condition and economic damages under Section 1983.92
A. A Mandatory Injunction Cannot Be the Proper Remedy in
Most Cases
Out of the possible remedies, issuance of a mandatory injunction
requiring the government to issue the desired permit without conditions
is the easiest to reject. In William J. (Jack) Jones Insurance Trust v. City
of Fort Smith,93 the plaintiff sought a permit to build a convenience store
adjacent to his already-operational gas station.94 The City refused to
grant the permit unless the plaintiff gave up an expanded right-of-way
along the property to expand a street, which the plaintiff would not do.95
District Judge Morris S. Arnold, now on the Eighth Circuit, concluded
that the City had not met its burden under Nollan to show that the
“plaintiff’s planned expansion of its business will create additional burdens
on the present public right-of-way along” the street.96 But the furthest-
reaching portion of the opinion was the last sentence, which described
the remedy for the Nollan violation: “an injunction will issue ordering
the City to issue the requested permit unconditionally.”97
Judge Arnold’s remedy was extraordinary. Going back to the
formation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it has always been
recognized as a partial repudiation of the “greater-includes-the-lesser”
92 The Florida Legislature recently amended the law to clarify that a state law remedy
exists for failed exactions. The relevant statute provides that, “[i]n addition to other
remedies available in law or equity, a property owner may bring an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction under this section to recover damages caused by a prohibited
exaction.” Fla. Stat. § 70.45(2). Before bringing a claim, the affected property owner must
file a notice explaining to the relevant agency why he believes the exaction is prohibited.
Id. § 70.45(3). The government then must respond in writing with an explanation of why
the particular exaction satisfies Nollan and Dolan. Id. § 70.45(3)(a). Should the dispute
proceed to litigation, the statute places the burden on the government to prove that the
exaction satisfies the nexus and rough proportionality requirements. Id. 70.45(4). Given
the dispute over remedy that still exists in the ongoing Koontz litigation, it was sensible
for the legislature to make this clarification. It should not be read as an admission that
no such remedy existed before the statute was passed.
93 William J. Jones Ins. v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
94 Id. at 913.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 914.
97 Id.
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rationale.98 As such, courts finding a condition unconstitutional cannot
issue a mandatory injunction unless the permitting authority lacks the
discretion to deny the permit after the condition is struck.99 To do so
would be to deny the existence of the greater power because of the agency’s
abuse of a lesser power.100 The Court observed as much in Koontz, noting
that “[e]ven if [the water district] would have been entirely within its
rights in denying the permit for some other reason, that greater author-
ity does not imply a lesser power to condition permit approval on [Mr.
Koontz’s] forfeiture of his constitutional rights.”101 In a failed exaction
situation, the government’s power to deny the permit outright is gener-
ally not at issue.102 Thus, it is usually not an appropriate remedy to order
the issuance of an unconditional permit when the government may,
through its legitimate power, deny the permit.103
It is important to note that a permitting agency’s power to deny a
permit application for legitimate reasons does not mean that the denial
will be without consequences. On the contrary, outright denial could give
rise to takings liability if it leaves the property with no viable economic
use.104 In such cases, the government agency’s proffered rationale is
98 See supra Part I.A.
99 See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986).
100 See id.
101 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013) (citing Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987)); see also City of Little Rock v. Goss, 151
F.3d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing an order directing a city to re-zone property because
the city “has a legitimate interest in declining to rezone [the] property, and the city may
pursue that interest by denying [the property owner’s] rezoning application outright, as
opposed to denying it because of [his] refusal to agree to an unconstitutional condition.”).
102 See Fenster, supra note 10, at 623 (“The most significant legal question that failed
exactions raise is whether Nollan and Dolan’s intermediate scrutiny applies to them.”);
id. at 641 (“Nollan and Dolan presume that the government always has the option under
its police power authority to reject the development application rather than approv[e] it
with an exaction attached.”).
103 Of course, the permit denial may still be challenged and entirely invalidated under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 548–49 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
549 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“The case
before us represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has exceeded the
limits imposed by due process.”); Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989)
(collecting Seventh Circuit cases for the proposition that landowners may challenge land
use regulations as violations of due process). A denial may also constitute a regulatory
taking under the ad hoc Penn Central balancing test. In such a case, the conclusion that
a taking has occurred would be based on the denial’s effect on the landowner’s existing
property interests, rather than on an exaction theory. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
104 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–18 (1992).
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irrelevant; the action is a “categorical” taking.105 Even if courts lack the
power to issue a mandatory injunction, permitting agencies will have to
tread somewhat carefully to avoid takings liability, even if they do pos-
sess a substantial interest in denying the permit.
B. Mere Invalidation Is Not Enough
As noted above, some have suggested that the only federal remedy
for a failed attempt to impose an unconstitutional condition should be
invalidation of that condition.106 Under this theory, once a condition is
invalidated by a court, the permitting decision is remanded to the gov-
ernment agency, which has an opportunity to reconsider its decision and
impose another condition.107 Such a regime is beneficial to local planning
boards—they will suffer little recourse for imposing conditions that turn
out to be unconstitutional.108 Woodward argues that this is a desirable
result because a monetary remedy would “force the permitting authority
to go forward with a decision that it might not want to make after being
put on notice that the condition it has imposed is not permissible.”109 But
this overlooks the fact that the imposition of the condition, in and of itself,
is a significant constitutional injury.110 The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine should provide more protection against the violation of a consti-
tutional right than would simple invalidation and remand.
105 See id. at 1015. The Court emphasized that a government entity could violate the
Takings Clause in two ways: “when land-use regulation ‘does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.’ ” Id. at
1016 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (emphasis added). Thus, a taking in the Lucas frame-
work does not depend on a judicial evaluation of government interests, investment-backed
expectations, or any other factors. If a permit denial deprives a property of all viable
economic use, it will be declared a taking. Id.
106 See generally Woodward, supra note 79.
107 See id. at 740 (“Invalidation only zeroes out the offending condition, which can then
be narrowed or otherwise tailored to be constitutional.”).
108 See id. at 740 n.248 (“While equitable in nature, [invalidation] is not a severe remedy
and is in fact more lenient towards a permitting authority than would be a compensation
remedy.”).
109 Id. at 740.
110 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (“[R]egardless of whether the government ultimately
succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively
withholding benefits from those who exercise them.”); id. at 2596 (“As in other uncon-
stitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede a constitutional right in the
face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a con-
stitutionally cognizable injury.”).
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Justice Brennan made the case against invalidation as the sole
remedy in his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego.111 Having found a regulatory taking,112 he addressed “whether a
government entity may constitutionally deny payment of just compensa-
tion to the property owner and limit his remedy to mere invalidation of
the regulation instead.”113 He correctly concluded that “[i]nvalidation
unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly compensate the land-
owner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was
taken.”114 More importantly, “[i]nvalidation hardly prevents enactment
of subsequent unconstitutional regulations by the government entity.”115
On the contrary, it permits the government to continue imposing such
regulations.116 The worst that could happen to a permitting entity in that
situation would be a court order telling it to go back and try again.117
This reasoning applies equally in the failed exactions context. In
a world where invalidation of the condition was the only remedy for the
imposition of an unconstitutional condition, permitting agencies would
be empowered to prevent development indefinitely.118 In theory, the agency
111 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
112 To be sure, San Diego Gas & Electric was a pure regulatory takings case, not an un-
constitutional conditions case. But Justice Brennan’s arguments concerning the weakness
of the invalidation remedy in the takings context apply equally to failed exaction cases.
113 San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 655.
115 Id. at 655 n.22.
116 See id.
117 Indeed, California city attorneys were advised at a 1974 conference that “if all else
fails, merely amend the regulation and start over again.” Id. A longer passage is quite
instructive to show the weakness of a mere invalidation remedy.
If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a
claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose,
don’t worry about it. All is not lost. One of the extra “goodies” contained
in the recent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San
Buenaventura appears to allow the City to change the regulation in
question, even after trial and judgment, make it more reasonable, more
restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again.
See how easy it is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the
battle and still win the war. Good luck.
San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. 655 n.22 (quoting James Longtin, Avoiding and Defend-
ing Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation), 38B
NIMLO MUN. L. REV. 175, 192–93 (1975)).
118 Consider the situation in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526
U.S. 687 (1999). There, the landowners first created a development plan in 1981 but had re-
vised plans repeatedly rejected by the planning commission, preventing any development.
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need not ever grant any permit.119 Rather, it could continue going through
iterations of the administrative process for all eternity, imposing differ-
ent conditions and having the courts strike each down as unconstitu-
tional. In the meantime, the property owner is held in legal limbo, unable
to make desired use of the property without a permit but also unable to
claim complete victory in court even after winning on multiple condi-
tions.120 With the usual disparity in resources between individual prop-
erty owners and government agencies, the latter will usually be able to
win in property disputes simply by attrition.121
Mere invalidation of an unconstitutional condition is equivalent
to granting the government a “do-over” for violating the property owner’s
constitutional rights. Deterring constitutional violations is one of the im-
portant purposes of Section 1983 liability.122 But an invalidation remedy
would hardly deter anyone from committing the same or similar violations
See id. at 695–98. “After five years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, [the
property owners] decided the city would not permit development of the property under
any circumstances.” Id. at 698. A jury eventually determined in 1994 that the planning
commission’s actions had effected a taking, id. at 701, and the Supreme Court affirmed
in 1999, id. at 723. Thus, it took 18 years to finally resolve the conflict between the prop-
erty owners and the planning commission.
119 The ability to indefinitely hold up the permitting process by repeatedly amending con-
ditions is distinct from a permitting agency’s legitimate power to deny a permit application.
When it denies a permit, an agency must provide some reason for its decision, lest it be
held an arbitrary exercise of power. Moreover, the landowner may at least challenge the
denial as lacking a reasonable basis or as a taking under Lucas or Penn Central. When
the agency holds the permit application in flux, the property owner has no remedy and
never receives a final decision. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–16; Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 124–35.
120 See Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 111 n.167 (2012)
(indicating that a problem with a pure invalidation remedy in regulatory takings is “that
an actor could engage in a series of regulatory takings with impunity by simply dropping
or amending a given regulation upon losing a challenge.”).
121 See id. at 113–14.
122 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”); City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981) (“Respondent is correct in asserting that the
deterrence of future abuses of power by persons acting under color of state law is an im-
portant purpose of § 1983.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism
Concerns and Municipal Accountability under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 548
(1989) (“Commentators generally agree that the Forty-Second Congress enacted section
1983 for at least four purposes: (1) to deter the Ku Klux Klan or others of like mind from
violating the constitutional rights of innocent citizens; (2) to provide a federal remedy for any
violations of constitutional rights; (3) to provide compensation to the victims of lawless
state action; and (4) to reaffirm the underlying principles of the fourteenth amendment.”).
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in the future.123 This conclusion is not based on conjecture; the City Attor-
ney quoted by Justice Brennan illustrates how local governments are
willing to string out the permitting process so long as they suffer no conse-
quences other than seeing the unconstitutional condition struck down.124
Far from proper deterrence, invalidation and remand may actually en-
courage regulators to continue to impose unconstitutional conditions so
long as it accomplishes their goal of limiting development.125
On the other hand, if local land use boards were aware that they
could be subject to damages for the threatened imposition of an unconsti-
tutional condition, the deterrence value of an unconstitutional condition
finding would skyrocket. Instead of proposing a condition first and then
having a court decide whether it is constitutional under Nollan and Dolan,
agencies would be encouraged to impose more legally defensible condi-
tions on the use of private property. Just as a damages remedy in a Fourth
Amendment excessive force case serves to encourage police not to over-
step their bounds in confrontations with suspects, a damages remedy in
the failed exactions context would encourage regulators to remain within
the limits of the Constitution when imposing land-use exactions.
C. Damages Remedies Are Common in Other Unconstitutional
Conditions Contexts
Woodward has suggested that “[i]n general, the remedy for an
unconstitutional conditions violation is invalidation of the condition.”126
Under that view, the protection against unconstitutional conditions “oper-
ates to remove barriers to obtaining important public benefits, but it does
not guarantee their acquisition.”127 While it is true that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine does not guarantee the receipt of government
benefits, that recognition rules out only the mandatory injunction rem-
edy.128 It says nothing about whether a property owner—or any other
unconstitutional conditions plaintiff—may recover compensatory dam-
ages as a result of the imposition of the condition.129
For example, Woodward cites two of the Supreme Court’s most
well-known unconstitutional conditions cases, Perry v. Sindermann130
123 San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 655–56 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 Woodward, supra note 79, at 714.
127 Id. at 715.
128 See supra Part III.A.
129 See supra Part III.B.
130 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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and Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.131
In Perry, a college professor sought damages and reinstatement after the
college declined to renew his one-year employment contract when he en-
gaged in a high-profile dispute with the Board of Regents.132 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Fifth Circuit
reversed and held that a factual dispute should have precluded judgment
as a matter of law on the First Amendment claim.133 The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the professor’s lack of tenure did not preclude his
unconstitutional conditions claim.134 However, the Court said nothing
about the proper remedy; it merely agreed that the district court was
wrong to dispose of the First Amendment claim on summary judgment.135
In Mount Healthy, a teacher sued the board of education asserting
that he was dismissed in retaliation for several controversial incidents,
including a phone call he made to a local radio station.136 The district
court held that the teacher was entitled to reinstatement with back-pay,
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.137 But the Supreme Court vacated the
lower courts, holding that the district court should have determined
“whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s reemploy-
ment even in the absence of the protected conduct.”138 As a result, the
Court had no occasion to consider the proper remedy. That was left to the
district court on remand.
131 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
132 Perry, 408 U.S. at 594–96; Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 942 (5th Cir. 1970) (“He
sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys fees, a declaratory judgment
adjudicating that the Regents’ action violated his constitutional rights and that he was
entitled to a hearing under suggested procedural guidelines, and a mandatory injunction
requiring his reinstatement for the 1969–70 college year at the same level of responsibility
and function he had previously held.”).
133 Sindermann, 430 F.2d at 943.
134 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597–98.
135 See id. at 598 (“For this reason we hold that the grant of summary judgment against
the respondent, without full exploration of this issue, was improper.”).
136 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 281–82.
137 Id. at 276.
138 Id. at 287. This is similar to the rule in garden-variety employment discrimination
cases. There, if an employee can prove that an impermissible purpose was a “motivating
factor” in an employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision anyway. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 266–67 (1989) (plurality opinion) (superseded by 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) (2012), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) (2012). If the employer succeeds, the em-
ployee is not entitled to damages or reinstatement. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(1) (2012).
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Neither Perry nor Mount Healthy hold that unconstitutional con-
ditions plaintiffs are entitled only to rescission of the condition.139 There
is no support for that proposition in other leading Supreme Court uncon-
stitutional conditions cases, either. For example, in Agency for Interna-
tional Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,140 the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment invalidating a condition on federal
funding requiring them to “not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitu-
tion and sex trafficking.”141 All the plaintiffs wanted in that case was a
judicial declaration that the condition on their speech imposed by federal
law was invalid—they never sought damages.142 The Court obliged, holding
that the condition violated the First Amendment.143 As a result, the plain-
tiffs could receive the federal money without altering their speech.144
Alliance for Open Society illustrates that in many unconstitutional con-
ditions cases, the plaintiff seeks only invalidation and that is quite enough
to provide a proper remedy.145
On the other hand, many federal cases have awarded plaintiffs
damages remedies in unconstitutional conditions cases, casting serious
doubt on the contention “that the remedy for an unconstitutional condi-
tions violation is invalidation.”146 The Seventh Circuit case of Nekolny v.
Painter147 is illustrative. There, three local government employees al-
leged they were dismissed from their jobs in retaliation for supporting
their supervisor’s political opponent.148 A jury agreed with them and
awarded a total of $69,000 in lost earnings, $15,000 in punitive damages,
and $10,000 for emotional distress.149 The Court of Appeals reversed only
the emotional distress award, concluding that the evidence presented
139 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 593; Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 274.
140 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
141 Id. at 2324–25 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012)).
142 See id. at 2332.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 In any case, it is quite difficult to establish actual damages linked to a speech-related con-
dition outside the public-employment context. See Harvard Law Review Association, Measure
of Damages in Constitutional Torts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 267, 275 (1986) (“[I]nterference with
an individual’s rights to free speech, freedom from discrimination, or other constitutional
protections is an injury for which presumed damages seem particularly appropriate, given
the likelihood that an individual has suffered from the deprivation of such rights and will
typically face difficulty in establishing the dollar value of dignitary injuries.”).
146 Woodward, supra note 79, at 720–21.
147 See Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981).
148 Id. at 1165.
149 Id. at 1166.
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was “insufficient to constitute proof of compensable mental or emotional
injury.”150 Importantly, it left in place the punitive damages award.151 If
invalidation of the condition were the only proper remedy for the imposi-
tion of the unconstitutional condition, the most the plaintiffs could have
been entitled to was reinstatement and back-pay.152 Several other free
speech cases confirm that more than mere equitable relief is available for
unconstitutional conditions violations.153
D. Failed Exactions Are Analogous to Arbitrary and Capricious
Permit Denials, Where Courts Have Consistently Awarded
Damages
While it is natural to compare the “failed exaction” cases to other
unconstitutional conditions cases, a more helpful analogy is to those in-
stances where courts have found the denial of a permit to be “so arbitrary
or irrational as to violate due process.”154 To be clear, this is not to say
that Nollan/Dolan exactions cases are analytically indistinct from sub-
stantive due process permit denial challenges. They are not. Even after
the Supreme Court jettisoned the “substantially advances a legitimate
state interest” language from its takings jurisprudence in Lingle,155 many
courts and commentators have referred to Nollan/Dolan “heightened scru-
tiny,” as opposed to the rational basis review conducted in substantive
due process cases.156 The Nollan/Dolan test is not equivalent to rational
150 Id. at 1172 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.20).
151 Id. at 1173.
152 Although it is a monetary award, back-pay is generally considered to be equitable in
nature and is awarded along with injunctive relief in employment discrimination cases.
See Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571–72 (1990).
It is therefore not technically an award of damages.
153 See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 874–75 (10th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff in
public employee speech case could recover a maximum of $50,000 for emotional distress);
Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming award of $25,000 for
mental anguish, humiliation, and lost reputation in a free speech unconstitutional con-
ditions case); Dishnow v. Sch. Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 199 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming
a damages award for termination in retaliation for speech and holding that “[w]hen a
right of liberty or property that is protected by the due process clauses is infringed . . .
the plaintiff can recover his full common law damages, including damages for emotional
injury, loss of reputation, and other intangibles” (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted)).
154 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 See id. at 532 (majority opinion) (“This case requires us to decide whether the ‘substan-
tially advances’ formula announced in Agins is an appropriate test for determining
whether a regulation effects a Fifth Amendment taking. We conclude that it is not.”).
156 See, e.g., B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1167 (Utah 2006)
(granting review to address “whether the Nollan/Dolan heightened-scrutiny rough
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basis review.157 Nevertheless, for the purpose of determining the proper
remedy, failed exactions are comparable to substantive due process cases.
Both are examples of abuse of power by permitting agencies that ulti-
mately lead to the denial of permit applications. Property owners suffer
a similar injury in both cases.
In due process permitting cases, federal courts have recognized that
plaintiffs are entitled to damages under Section 1983 for an arbitrary and
capricious denial of a permit application. For example, in Cunningham
v. City of Overland,158 the Eighth Circuit stated that “applicants for building
permits state substantive due process claims if they allege the governing
authorities capriciously and arbitrarily impose an unconstitutional con-
dition on the granting of a permit.”159 In the event a plaintiff could
establish such a claim, “both compensatory and punitive damages [would
be] available upon proper proof.”160 The court there upheld a jury verdict
of $125,000 in actual and punitive damages for the arbitrary and capri-
cious denial of a license to do business.161 Similarly, in Bateson v. Geisse,162
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a finding of a substantive due process viola-
tion when the City of Billings arbitrarily refused to issue the plaintiff a
building permit.163 The court found that the City and individual council
proportionality test applies where an alleged taking results from a uniform land-use
scheme rather than an ad hoc site-specific adjudicative decision”); McClung v. City of
Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ invitation to apply
Nollan and Dolan to a legislatively imposed exaction in part because “[t]o extend the
Nollan/Dolan analysis here would subject any regulation governing development to higher
scrutiny and raise the concern of judicial interference with the exercise of local govern-
ment police powers.” (second emphasis added)); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Cnty. of Stanislaus,
118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“Such a generally applicable requirement
imposed as a condition of development is subject to a ‘reasonable relationship’ level of
judicial scrutiny, as opposed to the heightened scrutiny applied to the imposition of land-
use conditions in individual cases as outlined in [Nollan and Dolan].”); James S. Burling
& Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and Other Legis-
lative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 407–17 (2009) (arguing that
Lingle provides additional support to impose heightened scrutiny on legislative exactions);
Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality
of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 731 (2007)
(“This two-part test [of Nollan and Dolan] has been characterized as a heightened scrutiny
takings test.”).
157 Reznick, supra note 156.
158 Cunningham v. City of Overland, 804 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986).
159 Id. at 1068.
160 Id. at 1069 (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)).
161 Cunningham, 804 F.2d at 1067, 1070–71.
162 See Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).
163 Id. at 1303–04.
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members were liable for damages.164 And in Marks v. City of Chesapeake,165
the Fourth Circuit upheld a nominal damages award for the arbitrary
denial of a land-use permit.166
Although property owners rarely prevail on challenges to land-use
regulations under a substantive due process theory,167 the few cases
above illustrate that when they do, they are entitled to damages under
federal law. To a property owner, there is little difference between an ar-
bitrary denial of a permit application and denial because the owner
refused to accede to an unconstitutional condition.168 In both cases, the
permitting agency has abused its powers by withholding a government
benefit for an improper reason.169 And in both cases, damages are the
only remedy that suffices to compensate the property owner and deter
future constitutional violations.170
What is more, damages are much easier to ascertain in permit de-
nial cases than for speech restrictions. Outside of the loss of employment
164 Id. at 1306 (“[A]ppellants’ withholding of Bateson’s building permit violated Bateson’s
substantive due process rights, took place pursuant to a municipal policy, and caused
Bateson’s damages.”); see also Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 197 (“The remedy for a
regulation that goes too far, under the due process theory, is not ‘just compensation,’ but
invalidation of the regulation, and if authorized and appropriate, actual damages.”).
165 See Marks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
166 Id. at 311–13. The district court had awarded nominal damages because the plaintiff’s
“evidence of damages was far too speculative.” Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
167 See Stewart M. Weiner, Comment, Substantive Due Process in the Twilight Zone:
Protecting Property Interests from Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1467,
1467–68 (1996).
168 The Eighth Circuit’s Cunningham opinion demonstrates this similarity, particularly
when it refers to the arbitrary imposition of an unconstitutional condition on the granting
of a permit in the context of a substantive due process claim. See Cunningham, 804 F.2d
at 1068.
169 The Nollan/Dolan doctrine identifies situations where the permitting agency has
exceeded its authority by making an extortionate demand not sufficiently related in kind
or scope to the effects of the proposed development. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
170 Property owners may prefer the issuance of a mandatory injunction in due process
cases as well as failed exactions, but, as discussed above, such a remedy is not always
possible. Suppose a property owner applied for a building permit and was denied for the
simple reason that a majority of the members of the permitting agency did not like the
color of the proposed house, even though the relevant code does not say that aesthetics
can constitute a valid reason for denying a permit. Such a decision would be “arbitrary”
or “irrational” under any definition of those words, and thus the permit denial would
violate due process. But courts would have difficulty ordering the agency to issue the
permit unless they were convinced that the agency could have no legitimate reason to
deny it again. Thus, in many cases damages are the only way to adequately compensate
a property owner after a permit denial.
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and wages (both of which can be addressed through equitable remedies),
it is difficult to calculate damages caused by imposing a condition on
speech.171 Often, there may be no appreciable damages that cannot be
awarded through back-pay.172 But in permit denial cases (whether they
be failed exaction challenges under Koontz or substantive due process
cases), there will nearly always be economic repercussions. The denial of
a land-use permit could cause a property owner to be unable to start173 or
expand a business,174 or simply require a landowner to give up real estate
that has other productive uses.175 Unlike in the speech context, equitable
relief often provides little help to these property owners. Therefore, eco-
nomic damages are the only way to satisfy Section 1983’s primary pur-
pose to compensate those who suffer a constitutional injury.176
171 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 145, at 275.
172 See, e.g., id. at 282–83, 283 n.40.
173 See Goss, 151 F.3d at 862 (denial of application to rezone property from residential to
commercial).
174 See Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1302 (denial of permit to builder who sought to build con-
dominium development and convenience store on his newly acquired property).
175 See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
176 It can also be argued that property rights cases are fundamentally different from typical
First Amendment unconstitutional conditions cases. For one, failed exaction cases involve
the defense of the fundamental right to private property. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36, 115 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Blackstone classifies these fundamental
rights under three heads, as the absolute rights of individuals, to wit: the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. And of the last he
says: ‘The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property, which
consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any
control or diminution save only by the laws of the land.’ ”); Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council and Justice Scalia’s Primer on Property Rights: Advancing
New Democratic Traditions by Defending the Tradition of Property, 24 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 206 (2000) (“Repeatedly, the Framers justified private prop-
erty as a fundamental right by referring to fundamental tradition.”). When a property
owner sees his land-use permit application denied, he loses the right to use his property as
he would like. As the Nollan Court recognized, “the right to build on one’s own property—
even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements—cannot
remotely be described as a ‘governmental benefit.’ ” Nollan, 483 U.S. at 845 n.2.
On the contrary, public employment and federal funding are plainly governmental
benefits. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1976) (citing Perry, 408 U.S. 597).
Therefore, even if it were true that courts had recognized invalidation as the sole remedy
for unconstitutional conditions cases in the First Amendment context, it would not neces-
sarily follow that the same should be true in property rights cases. Those claiming an
entitlement to a government benefit are simply not on equal footing with those attempting
to exercise a fundamental right. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting that
while public education is not a constitutional right, “neither is it merely some governmental
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”); see also Lynn
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E. Calculating Damages in Failed Exaction Cases
If damages are available for failed exactions, how should they be
calculated? After all, not all demands are equal. Valuation in this context
suffers from some of the same inherent difficulty as do breach of contract
actions seeking damages in the form of lost profits.177 Like future profits,
the economic value of a permit that was never granted may be specula-
tive.178 However, valuation of land is not quite as difficult as determining
how much money a yet-to-be-established business will make in its first
year of operation. As such, a fair award of damages will be possible in
many cases.
Real estate has a rental value that depends in part on the parcel’s
permitted use.179 Existence of a particular zoning designation or permit-
ted use may significantly alter a parcel’s value.180 Indeed, the Koontz
majority stated that the “central concern” of Nollan and Dolan was to
prevent government from imposing conditions that “diminish without jus-
tification the value of the property.”181 Thus, it only makes sense that the
proper measure of damages should be the value lost as a result of the
imposition of the unconstitutional condition.182
A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward of Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1247 (1990) (pointing out that conditional allocations of federal
funding is a challenge to the role of the Court, as “the Court is not directly concerned
with straightforward violations of constitutional rights as it is when faced with constitu-
tional challenges not involving conditions on benefits”) (emphasis omitted).
177 See SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:10 (4th ed. 2015).
178 See Marks, 883 F.2d at 309, 311 (upholding award of only nominal damages to property
owner who was arbitrarily denied permit to operate a fortune-telling business on the prop-
erty because of lack of evidence of actual damages); see also Daniel L. Siegal & Robert
Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 479, 521 (2010) (arguing that landowners have a difficult time proving actual damages
for temporary regulatory takings when the land is not currently being used for anything).
179 It is well established that zoning laws affect a parcel’s rental value. See, e.g., James
C. Ohls, et al., The Effect of Zoning on Land Value, 1 J. URB. ECON. 428, 430–32 (1974).
180 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 65–66 (1985) (noting that
restrictive zoning may benefit the owners of already-developed land while decreasing the
value of undeveloped land).
181 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600. Of course, the property in Koontz itself would have been
worth much more with a development permit than without one; so much so that the trial
court awarded Mr. Koontz $376,154. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz,
5 So. 3d. 8, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Koontz IV) (Griffin, J., dissenting).
182 This is perhaps the best reason why the remedy in the failed exactions case is different
from cases like Nollan and Dolan, which involved conditional permit approvals. In the
paradigmatic Nollan/Dolan case, the property owner receives the benefit of the permit
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It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the exact calcu-
lation of damages in every failed exaction case. However, the Florida
courts in Koontz applied a formula that would likely work in most cases.
As dissenting Judge Griffin explained in Koontz IV, the trial court
awarded damages equivalent to “the rental value of the property based
on a valuation with the permit” less the value of the property without the
permit.183 Of course, the state court awarded damages under the theory
that the permit denial effected a temporary taking of Mr. Koontz’s
property.184 Nonetheless, the court’s valuation illustrates that it is within
the judicial competence to value property with and without a land-use
permit. Courts should not shy away from awarding damages simply be-
cause there is no precise valuation method; if that were common practice,
damages would be unavailable in many cases.185
F. Conclusion
Whether property owners may successfully sue for damages when
their permit is denied after a failed exaction will have a profound effect
on land-use decisions. The availability of actual damages would presum-
ably shape the actions of local governments more than has the Koontz
at the cost of an exaction. Thus, the property owner’s injury is the exaction itself, rather
than the loss of the permit. The Court also distinguished the two, noting that “the Fifth
Amendment mandates a particular remedy—just compensation—only for takings.”
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (emphasis omitted). After Koontz, it appears fairly clear that
the available remedy in Nollan/Dolan cases is just compensation for the exacted property.
183 Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 17 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
184 See id. at 10 (majority opinion) (“After hearing conflicting evidence, the trial court
concluded that the District had effected a taking of Mr. Koontz’s property and awarded
damages.”). Some courts have taken this view after Koontz. For example, a Montana trial
court awarded damages under Section 1983 of $542,772 to property owners who had their
application for a development permit denied for failure to accede to an unconstitutional
condition. See also Hamlin Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. BDV-2008-
208, at 29 (Mont. D. Ct. Jan. 14, 2014). That court also found that the condition’s failure
to comply with the Nollan/Dolan standard effected a taking. Id. at 27. The Florida court’s
assessment of damages in a manner analogous to a temporary physical taking would
certainly work in some failed exaction cases where specific losses resulting from the
denial are clear and the offending regulations have been repealed. See id. at 28–29; see
also Koontz IV, 8 So. 3d at 17 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting that the trial court awarded
damages “from 1999, when the permit was denied, until the permit was issued in 2005”).
185 Cf. Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1942)
(rejecting the argument that Congress would not have meant to impose a tax based on
an estimate of value and noting that “ ‘market value’, for instance, in the case of city real
estate, is often a mirage”).
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opinion. Without damages, permitting authorities have little incentive
to conform to the Nollan/Dolan standard now applicable to permit deni-
als. As Woodward points out, “invalidation triggers time-out that allows
the permitting authority to stop and think about what it should do next:
exercise eminent domain power or attempt to modify the condition.”186
This sort of slap on the wrist is unlikely to provoke governments to respect
property rights the way the Koontz majority envisioned. The most it can
accomplish is to compel further negotiation.
That is not enough to ensure that governmental agencies will do
what is required by Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. Section 1983, with its
dual purposes of compensation and deterrence of constitutional viola-
tions, must provide a monetary remedy to those who are denied use and
enjoyment of their property by an unconstitutional permit denial. With-
out a damages remedy, the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious
permit denials masquerading as attempted exactions—declared by the
Koontz majority to be of the utmost importance—will be rendered illu-
sory.187 It does property owners little good for the Supreme Court to de-
clare that they have the right to be free from coercive exactions but allow
them only an ineffective remedy. If that happens, the Takings Clause
will again be “relegated to the status of a poor relation”188 among the Bill
of Rights.
IV. KOONTZ AND WILLIAMSON COUNTY RIPENESS—THE DOOR TO
FEDERAL COURT IS AJAR
The fact that all nine justices agreed that no taking occurred
under the facts in Koontz has broad significance outside of the question
186 Woodward, supra note 79, at 740.
187 In a similar fashion, it is now generally recognized that the Fourth Amendment right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is illusory if not accompanied
by exclusion of the evidence uncovered in the illegal search. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 42–43 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (stating that “[w]ithout the [exclusionary] rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be ‘a form of words’, valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties.”). In the Fourth Amend-
ment context, it is damages that are the inadequate remedy as compared to suppression
of the evidence. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 43 (“The appealing ring softens when we recall that
in a trespass action the measure of damages is simply the extent of the injury to physical
property. If the officer searches with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages—a
penny, or a dollar.”). Nominal damages in a Fourth Amendment case neither adequately
compensate a defendant nor deter an officer. The same is true of an invalidation remedy
in the failed exaction context.
188 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 392.
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of remedy. If properly applied, that finding should relieve failed exaction
plaintiffs of any obligation to “ripen” their claims in state court. Even if
we assume the correctness of the Williamson County rule as stated,189 the
origins of the rule show that it should not apply to non-takings claims,
including freestanding unconstitutional conditions claims. Therefore,
failed exaction plaintiffs should be able to bring their damages claims
directly in federal court.
A. Brief Overview of the Williamson County State Litigation
Requirement
In Williamson County, the Supreme Court created two barriers to
litigating takings claims in federal court. First, before a property owner
may bring a federal claim, the relevant government entity must have
reached a “final decision” on the owner’s permit application.190 Second—
and, for present purposes, more importantly—a property owner cannot
bring a federal claim until he has “[sought] compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so.”191 This has become the
well-known requirement that plaintiffs bring an inverse condemnation
suit in state court before a federal takings claim will be ripe.192
By itself, the state-court litigation rule would be a significant in-
convenience to takings plaintiffs, requiring them to go through two separate
rounds of litigation in order to raise a federal claim.193 But the situation
in practice is much worse. Because of the interaction between traditional
preclusion doctrines and the federal full-faith-and-credit statute,194
Williamson County actually prevents federal courts from addressing the
189 Williamson County ripeness is one of the most widely criticized doctrines in today’s
law. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 349–52 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell
Game! You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004); J. David
Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings Review? The Courts’ “Prudential” Answer to
Williamson County’s Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV.
319 (2014); Scott A. Keller, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness:
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings
Claims, 85 TEX. L. REV. 199, 239 (1996). It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss
the correctness of the ripeness rule itself.
190 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186.
191 Id. at 194.
192 See id. at 196 (referring to state inverse condemnation law as the proper way to seek
compensation from the state).
193 See id. at 173.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
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merits of takings claims at all.195 The Court justified the state litigation
requirement with reference to the text of the Just Compensation Clause.196
Because the Constitution does not forbid takings, but only takings with-
out just compensation—so the argument goes—there can be no violation
of the Just Compensation Clause until the regulatory takings plaintiff
has sought compensation by filing an inverse condemnation lawsuit.197
Since the state court may resolve the takings claim in conjunction with
the inverse condemnation suit, and re-litigation of that claim is barred
by preclusion principles, takings plaintiffs are kept out of federal court.
Whether or not the Supreme Court intended this result,198 it has become
well-established law.
B. The Rationale of Williamson County Is Inapplicable to
Failed Exactions
The Williamson County Court viewed the property owner’s cause
of action “as stating a claim under the Just Compensation Clause.”199
This view pervaded the Court’s analysis and explains why it created the
state litigation requirement.200 Indeed, the majority in San Remo noted
195 See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 342–45 (majority opinion); Berger & Kanner, supra note
189, at 687 (“The mechanism for keeping property owners out of federal court has been
the combination of Williamson County’s requirement of state court litigation with res
judicata, collateral estoppel, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and full faith and credit.”
(footnote omitted)).
196 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194–95.
197 Id.
198 Indeed, some courts and commentators believe that the Court did not intend to bar
takings plaintiffs from federal court in Williamson County. See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River
Cnty., 59 F.3d 852, 860–61 (9th Cir. 1995) (We disagree . . . with the suggestion that
Williamson County is a thinly-veiled attempt by the Court to eliminate the federal forum
for Fifth Amendment taking plaintiffs”); DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 521 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“The barring of the federal courthouse door to takings litigants seems an
unanticipated effect of Williamson County.”); J. David Breemer, Ripeness Madness: The
Expansion of Williamson County’s Baseless “State Procedures” Ripeness Requirement to
Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB. LAW. 615, 625 (2009) (“Nothing in Williamson County sug-
gests this was intended.”); Berger & Kanner, supra note 189, at 688 (arguing that the
language of Williamson County and the Court’s knowledge of existing preclusion doctrines
indicates that it did not intend to erect a bar to federal jurisdiction over takings claims).
199 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186.
200 See id. at 194 n.13 (“[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just
compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.
The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize
procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.”); see also J.
David Breemer, Ripening Federal Property Rights Claims, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 50, 51 (2009) (“In Williamson County, the Supreme Court clearly
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this distinction when it conceded that a property owner may raise claims
that seek “relief distinct from the provision of ‘just compensation’ ” directly
in federal court.201 Despite this, some federal courts have expanded
Williamson County ripeness far outside the realm of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause to encompass just about any property rights claim in federal
court, including due process and equal protection claims.202
As some have already argued, this expansion is unwarranted.203
The state litigation requirement “only exists due to the ‘special nature of
the Just Compensation Clause,’ ”204 and it is therefore inapplicable to
claims that seek a different remedy. In fact, “Williamson County con-
firms this view because it declined to apply the state procedures rule to
a due process claim that sought invalidation and Section 1983 damages
rather than a Just Compensation Clause remedy.”205 No Supreme Court
case has sanctioned the application of the state-litigation requirement
beyond the specific confines of Williamson County and the Just Com-
pensation Clause.206
If we accept the argument that the state litigation requirement
does not apply to non-just compensation claims, it follows that it does not
bar failed exaction claims. As noted, no property is ever taken in such
cases. How, then, could a property owner ever do what Williamson County
requires? After all, if a property owner has not suffered a taking, it would
generally be futile to ask a state court for “just compensation,” as none
would be available.207 Application of Williamson County to non-takings
derived the state litigation rule from the special nature of the ‘Just Compensation Clause’
of the Fifth Amendment.”); Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces in the
Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 7 (1999)
(“This exhaustion requirement, the Court explained, springs from the text of the Just
Compensation Clause, which prohibits only uncompensated takings of private property
for public use.”).
201 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 345–46.
202 See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994);
Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 709 (10th Cir. 1996); Kurtz v. Verizon
N.Y., Inc., 758 F.3d 510, 516 (2d. Cir. 2014).
203 See Breemer, supra note 198, at 650 (“A survey of the relevant federal circuit court
decisions fails to reveal any plausible doctrinal or logical ground for applying the state
procedures rule to due process and equal protection claims.”).
204 Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 169 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195 n.14).
205 Breemer, supra note 198, at 636 (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 197).
206 See id.
207 See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n of Allen Cnty., 306 F.3d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In
Williamson County, the Supreme Court adopted a limited exception to its exhaustion
requirement based on the futility of seeking state court relief.”).
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claims simply makes no logical sense. It has the effect of imposing an
exhaustion requirement on a class of federal civil rights plaintiffs without
any basis in the Constitution or federal law.208 Instead, property owners in
failed exaction cases should be permitted to seek damages directly in
federal court under Section 1983.209
208 It is well established that Section 1983 plaintiffs generally do not have to exhaust
state remedies before heading to federal district court. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982). Several
commentators have noted that Williamson County ripeness is inconsistent with this
general principle. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness
Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 99, 103, 124–26 (2000) (“No other
species of litigant seeking relief on federal constitutional grounds is subjected to this run-
around.”); John F. Pries, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 723, 726, 732 (2008) (arguing that Williamson County represents “a marked change
from past practice” in its willingness to allow state law to essentially decide federal con-
stitutional tort actions, and noting that “Williamson County’s conflict with Section 1983’s
no-exhaustion principle is obvious and has been widely criticized.”). That inconsistency
is even more pronounced outside of the special confines of the Just Compensation Clause.
209 It is true that even before Williamson County, federal courts sometimes abstained
from deciding takings claims. They often did so for similar reasons as courts now find
claims unripe under the state litigation requirement. For example, in Muskegon
Theatres, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1974), the Sixth Circuit
abstained from determining whether the City had taken the plaintiff’s leasehold, noting
that “[i]n several reported opinions, courts have abstained from exercising their federal
question jurisdiction in eminent domain contexts.” (footnote omitted). See also R.S.
Radford & Jennifer F. Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: After Nearly 30
Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court Under Williamson
County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492595 [http://perma.cc/7LMF-7FAH] (detail-
ing the use of abstention to dispose of pre–Williamson County federal takings claims in
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits). But see Ballard Fish & Oyster Co. v. Glaser Construction
Co., 424 F.2d 473, 474–75 (4th Cir. 1970) (rejecting a defendant’s contention that the
property owner should have been required to seek a remedy in the state courts by noting
that federal constitutional plaintiffs are generally not required to exhaust state remedies
to proceed in federal court).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the merits of federal courts using
abstention doctrines to avoid failed exaction cases. The purpose of this Part is only to argue
that federal courts should not use the Williamson County state litigation doctrine—which
has “greatly relaxed the requirements for declining to exercise Article III jurisdiction”—
as a vehicle to avoid these cases. Radford & Thompson, supra 209, at 49. That being said,
Radford and Thompson persuasively contend that in the years after Williamson County,
the Supreme Court has significantly limited the abstention doctrines used by the circuit
courts to decline jurisdiction over land-use cases. See id. at 49–51 (citing New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361–64 (1989); Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728, 731 (1996)). Quackenbush, in particular, seems to hold
that abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), is inappropriate in an
action for damages. See Radford & Thompson, supra 209, at 50.
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CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Koontz was a triumph for individual con-
stitutional rights. For one, all nine justices recognized that a government
entity violates the Constitution when it denies a land-use permit because
the property owner refused to accept an unconstitutional condition.210
Second, the Court accepted that demands to pay money, no less than exac-
tions of real property, create “special vulnerability” for property owners
going through the permitting process.211 Both of these developments
mean that landowners will be less susceptible to bullying by local govern-
ments and more able to protect their constitutional property rights.212
But important questions remain, the resolution of which could determine
whether Koontz fulfills its significant promise.
First, partly due to the procedural posture of the case, the Court
declined to say what remedies might be available upon proof that a per-
mit denial violated the Koontz principle. Of course, as the Koontz case
shows, states may devise their own remedies to deal with unconstitu-
tional conditions claims. But that ignores the fact that failed exactions
plaintiffs have suffered an injury cognizable under the federal constitu-
tion. Where there is a federal right, there must be a federal remedy.
This Article posits no more than that the federal remedy should
be consistent with the remedy in other cases brought under Section 1983:
actual damages. Mere invalidation of the offending condition is simply
not enough when the government holds the bargaining power and could
easily replace the condition with another equally objectionable one the
second time around. The dual purposes of Section 1983 are to compen-
sate victims of constitutional torts and deter government agents from
committing such violations in the future.213 Standing alone, invalidation
of the condition accomplishes neither of these goals. Without accompany-
ing damages, the affected property owner receives nothing while permit-
ting agency is free to impose further conditions. The result could be years
of fighting over permit conditions without the ability to use the property.
In order to realize the promise of the Koontz decision and encour-
age regulators to make sure that exactions do not go beyond mitigating
210 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595; id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 2599, 2603 (majority opinion).
212 See Christina M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz—Oh My!: The Exactions Trilogy
Require Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects, But No More, 51
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 39, 69 (2014).
213 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 599 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the actual social costs of development,214 federal courts should take the
Supreme Court’s invitation to develop a damages remedy in failed exac-
tion cases. If the premise of this Article is correct, the federal courts will
have more opportunities to hear these cases than traditional Nollan and
Dolan claims because of the absence of the Williamson County bar. While
some States may provide an adequate remedy in this situation, the dispute
between the majority and dissent in the Florida Court of Appeals in
Koontz reveals that it is not always so simple.215 Even if it were, Section
1983 does not leave the guaranty of federal constitutional rights to the
vagary of state statutes or enforcement by state courts. A federal dam-
ages remedy is necessary to preserve the vitality of Koontz.
214 See Martin, supra note 212, at 41 (Koontz recognizes that “government may legitimately
require landowners to carry their own weight, mitigating their development plans so that
they do not impose costs on their neighbors.”).
215 Compare Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 10–12 (majority opinion), with Koontz V, 2014 WL
1703942, at *8 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (“Because there was no ‘taking’ compensable under
the Fifth Amendment in this case, the question remains whether Koontz has a damages
remedy under [the Florida statute].”).
